not the first effect dominates the second. We show that the first effect dominates the second when networks are weak …

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering … network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case …

This paper investigates the patent licensing networks formed by competing firms. Assuming that licensing agreements can … of independent patents, we fully characterize the bilaterally efficient networks and find that when the cost reduction … efficient one. We also show that the bilaterally efficient networks can be sustained as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria with …

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices forinterconnected networks. Instead of considering … i pays to network j as a linear functionof the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In thecase of …

We study how access pricing affects network competition when consumers'subscription demand is elastic and networks …

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering … network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case …

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering … network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case …