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Powerful CEOs and Capital Structure Decisions : Evidence from the CEO Pay Slice (CPS)

Chintrakarn, Pandej - 2014

Motivated by agency theory, we explore how powerful CEOs view leverage. Due to the agency conflict, CEOs may adopt sub-optimal leverage levels that promote their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to gauge CEO...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061799

Capital structure and corporate governance quality: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

Jiraporn, Pornsit; Kim, Jang-Chul; Kim, Young Sang; … - In: International Review of Economics & Finance 22 (2012) 1, pp. 208-221

Grounded in agency theory, this study explores how capital structure is influenced by aggregate corporate governance quality. We measure governance quality using broad-based comprehensive governance metrics provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). The empirical evidence reveals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573111

Board characteristics and Chinese bank performance

Liang, Qi; Xu, Pisun; Jiraporn, Pornsit - In: Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 8, pp. 2953-2968

Using a sample of 50 largest Chinese banks during the period of 2003–2010, we explore a comprehensive set of board characteristics (size, composition and functioning of the board) and analyze their impacts on bank performance and bank asset quality in China. We find that the number of board...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010679275

Corporate diversification, managerial ownership, and firm value : evidence from the Thai financial crisis

Charoenwong, Charlie; Ding, David K.; Jiraporn, Pornsit - In: Journal of emerging markets 16 (2011) 1, pp. 7-30

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009412791

Corporate governance, shareholder rights and firm diversification : an empirical analysis

Jiraporn, Pornsit; Kim, Young Sang; Davidson, Wallace Norman - In: Journal of banking & finance 30 (2006) 3, pp. 947-963

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003300447

Corporate culture, cultural diversification, and independent directors : evidence from earnings conference calls

Chindasombatcharoen, Pongsapak; Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard; … - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental finance 37 (2023), pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014454734

Corporate Diversification, Managerial Ownership, and Firm Value : Evidence from the Thai Financial Crisis

Charoenwong, Charlie - 2013

This study investigates whether corporate diversification in Thailand led to value creation or destruction. The …, experience a value loss of more than 10% through their corporate diversification. The results suggest that the value loss due to … diversification stems from the presence of agency costs. The Asian Financial Crisis did not alter the propensity of Thai firms to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093774

How Do Powerful CEOs View Dividends and Stock Repurchases? Evidence from the CEO Pay Slice (CPS)

Chintrakarn, Pandej - 2018

Agency theory suggests that CEOs view dividends unfavorably because dividend payouts deprive them of the free cash flow they could otherwise exploit. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to measure CEO power, we find that an increase in CEO power by one standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926278

The Effect of Corporate Governance on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) : Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

Chintrakarn, Pandej - 2015

Motivated by agency theory, we explore the effect of corporate governance quality on corporate social responsibility (CSR), using the governance standards provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Our evidence reveals that firms with more effective governance make significantly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009777

How Do Independent Directors View Powerful CEOs? Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Jiraporn, Pornsit - 2015

Prior research shows that powerful CEOs can exacerbate the agency conflict, resulting in adverse corporate outcomes. Exploiting an exogenous shock introduced by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we explore whether board independence mitigates CEO power. Based on difference-in-difference...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009860