Showing 1 - 10 of 209
Motivated by agency theory, we investigate the effect of board size on corporate outcomes. To address endogeneity, we exploit the variations in the director-age populations across the states in the U.S. We argue that firms with access to a larger pool of potential directors tend to have larger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012984689
Prior research shows that firms tend to recruit directors from the geographically-proximate area. Due to a limited supply of qualified individuals in a given area, firms located in close proximity have to share a limited pool of talented individuals. As a result, the larger the number of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012862139
Purpose – Theory suggests that the market for corporate control, which constitutes an important external governance mechanism, may substitute for internal governance. Consistent with this notion, using a novel measure of takeover vulnerability primarily based on state legislation, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013239732
validates the results. i.e., propensity score matching, entropy balancing, GMM dynamic panel data estimation, and Oster’s (2019 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013403469
We contribute to the debate on the costs and benefits of busy directors by investigating the effect of busy directors on firm value during a stressful time, i.e. during the Great Recession. Our results show that busy directors improve firm value significantly during the financial crisis. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924951
Agency theory suggests that CEOs view dividends unfavorably because dividend payouts deprive them of the free cash flow they could otherwise exploit. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to measure CEO power, we find that an increase in CEO power by one standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926278
Motivated by agency theory, we explore the effect of corporate governance quality on corporate social responsibility (CSR), using the governance standards provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Our evidence reveals that firms with more effective governance make significantly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009777
mitigates CEO power. Based on difference-in-difference estimation, our evidence shows that independent directors view powerful …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009860
We explore the effect of co-opted directors on CEO power. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office and are found by prior research to represent a weakened governance mechanism. Our evidence reveals that co-opted directors lead to less powerful CEOs,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012991913
Staggered boards (or classified boards) constitute one of the most controversial governance provisions. A fierce debate continues on the costs and benefits of staggered boards. We contribute to the debate by investigating how financial analysts view staggered boards. It has been argued that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024713