Similar Search Results

Labor Investment Efficiency and CEO Tenure

James, Hui L.; Jiraporn, Pornsit; Wang, Hongxia - 2023

We examine the impact of CEO tenure on corporate labor investment efficiency. While some studies show that CEO … of CEO tenure on labor investment efficiency is stronger in human capital-intensive industries and firms with greater … are associated with more efficient labor investment. This finding is robust to alternative measures of labor investment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014348946

Managerial talent and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) : how do talented managers view Corporate Social Responsibility?

Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard; Jiraporn, Pornsit; Tong, Shenghui - In: International review of finance 16 (2016) 2, pp. 265-276

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011713704

Staggered Boards, Accounting Discretion, and Firm Value

Jiraporn, Pornsit - 2010

Motivated by agency theory, this study investigates how staggered boards influence accounting discretion. The results indicate that staggered boards do affect accounting discretion. In fact, the impact of staggered boards on accounting discretion is substantially larger (about seven times...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137651

How Does Delaware Incorporation Affect the Board of Directors?

Jiraporn, Pornsit - 2012

This study investigates the impact of Delaware law on the composition and size of the board of directors. Our empirical evidence reveals that Delaware firms have smaller and more independent boards than their non-Delaware counterparts. Given that we find no value-premium for firms that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116753

How Do Powerful CEOs View Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)? An Empirical Note

Jiraporn, Pornsit - 2013

We explore how powerful CEOs view investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR). The agency view suggests that CEOs invest in CSR to enhance their own private benefits. On the contrary, the conflict resolution view argues that CSR investments are made to resolve the conflicts among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085700

The Effect of Entrenched Boards on Corporate Risk-Taking : Testing the Quiet Life Hypothesis

Chintrakarn, Pandej - 2013

The quiet life hypothesis posits that entrenched managers are well-insulated from removal and thus prefer to enjoy a quiet life, i.e. they tend to be less ambitious, avoid difficult decisions, and engage in less risk-taking (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). We utilize the staggered board (or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085944

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and CEO Luck : Are Lucky CEOs Socially Responsible?

Jiraporn, Pornsit - 2013

“Lucky” CEOs are given stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing, severe agency problems, and poor corporate governance (Bebchuk, Grinstein, Peyer, 2010). We find that lucky (opportunistic) CEOs invest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087771

The Effect of CEO Luck on the Informativeness of Stock Prices : Do Lucky CEOS Improve Stock Price Informativeness?

Chintrakarn, Pandej - 2013

CEOs are “lucky” when they are granted stock options on days when the stock price is lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing and severe agency problems (Bebchuck, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010). Using idiosyncratic volatility as our measure of stock price...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013072852

Managerial Talent and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) : How Do Talented Managers View Corporate Social Responsibility?

Jiraporn, Pornsit - 2015

Motivated by the on-going debate on the costs and benefits of CSR, we explore how talented managers view CSR investments. Based on nearly 20,000 observations across 17 years, our evidence reveals a non-monotonic effect of managerial talent on CSR. Exploiting a novel measure of managerial ability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015404

How Do Powerful CEOs View Dividends and Stock Repurchases? Evidence from the CEO Pay Slice (CPS)

Chintrakarn, Pandej - 2018

Agency theory suggests that CEOs view dividends unfavorably because dividend payouts deprive them of the free cash flow they could otherwise exploit. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to measure CEO power, we find that an increase in CEO power by one standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926278