This paper studies the interaction between time inconsistency problems in labor market policy and monetary policy. When both policies are discretionary, there is a positive inflation bias, whereas the bias in labor market programs may be either positive or negative. A commitment of labor market...

Membership in a monetary union (EMU) is likely to imply stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than non-membership. For example, EMU entry may cause a move from a nonindexation to an indexation equilibrium. But more wage...

In a model with heterogenous agents, wage setting by monopoly unions and monetary policy conducted by a central bank, we show that the duration of nominal wage contracts is u-shaped in the degree of centralization, with intermediate bargaining systems yielding contracts of shorter duration and...

We show in a union-bargaining model that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment, but also nominal wage flexibility, and thus reduces employment variations in the case of nominal shocks. Long-term wage contracts lead to higher expected real wages...