We investigate a transfer pricing problem between two divisions within a decentralized firm. An upstream division produces an intermediate good that is used by another division within the firm and is also sold in an external market, where the firm competes with a rival selling a differentiated...

We study two-stage, multi-division budgeting mechanisms that allocate scarce resources among divisions using capital charge rates. Each divisional manager observes private sequential project information and competes for scarce financial or nonfinancial resources over two stages. The optimal...

This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we...

This paper studies the performance of delegated decision-making schemes in a two-stage, multi-division capital budgeting problem for a shared investment with an inherent abandonment option. Applying both robust goal congruence and sequential adverse selection frameworks, we show that the optimal...