This paper investigates the incentives market participants have in the German electricity balancing mechanism. Strategic over- and undersupply positions are the result of existing stochastic arbitrage opportunities between the spot market and the balancing mechanism. This strategic behavior can...

This paper investigates the incentives market participants have in the German electricity balancing mechanism. Strategic over- and undersupply positions are the result of existing stochastic arbitrage opportunities between the spot market and the balancing mechanism. This strategic behavior can...

This paper models the interdependencies between markets for secondary reserve capacity and spot electricity to derive the pricing of reserves under equilibrium conditions. Starting with the indifference condition between offering in both markets, the reservation price is derived from the...

This paper investigates the incentives market participants have in the German electricity balancing mechanism. Strategic over- and undersupply positions are the result of existing stochastic arbitrage opportunities between the spot market and the balancing mechanism. This strategic behavior can...

This paper investigates the incentives market participants have in the German electricity balancing mechanism. Strategic over- and under-supply positions are the result of existing stochastic arbitrage opportunities between the spot market and the balancing mechanism. This strategic behavior can...

This paper explores the economic implications of different contract durations in markets for on-line (primary and secondary) reserve capacity in Germany with the crucial feature of separate markets for spot energy and reserve capacity provision. The analysis is based on an equilibrium model...