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The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension
Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - 2003
A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325084
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The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - In: Games and economic behavior 61 (2007) 2, pp. 277-298
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003581209
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The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - 2004
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011560588
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The coalition structure core is accessible
Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - In: Games and economic behavior 48 (2004) 1, pp. 86-93
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002128596
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The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002148691
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The coalition structure core is accessible
Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001748317
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The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001748318
Cover Image
The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001788923
Cover Image
The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - 2003
A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591676
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The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of … - 2004
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005304938