We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We study five generalizations of convexity in the NTU...

While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and...

We present sucient conditions for the implementation of the (pessimistic) recursive core (Kóczy, 2007) in discrete partition function form games using a modified version of the sequential coalition formation game by Bloch (1996) extending the results of Kóczy (2008) and - in a slightly...

The quality of publications, approximated by the containing journal''s quality indicator, is often the basis for hire and promotion in academic and research positions. Over the years a handful of ranking methods have been proposed. Discussing the most prominent methodswe show that they are...

A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...

We discuss the two latest enlargements of the EU. While the 1995 entrants are by now fully integrated, the 2004 entrants will ``enjoy'''' a secondary status for a number of years. We attribute this difference to the fact that unlike the former EFTA members joining in 1995, the 2004 entrants...

We show the existence of an upper bound for the number of blocks required to get from one imputation to another provided that accessibility holds. The bound depends only on the number of players in the TU game considered. For the class of games with non-empty cores this means that the core can...

We show that the invariant method (Pinski and Narin, 1976), recently axiomatised by Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004), and used to quality-rank academic journals is subject to manipulation: a journal can boost its performance by making additional citations to other journals.

We provide two new characterizations of exact games. First, a game is exact if and only if it is exactly balanced; and second, a game is exact if and only if it is totally balanced and overbalanced. The condition of exact balancedness is identical to the one of balancedness, except that one of the...