We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams …. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college … admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions …" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) where students only apply to one …

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of … their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions …” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of 'centralized college … admissions' (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and 'decentralized college admissions' (DCA) where students only apply to …

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of … their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests …

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the … performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the … quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version …

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the … performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the … quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version …

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the … performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the … quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version …