Showing 1 - 10 of 148
We perform an experiment where subjects pay for the right to participate in a shareholder vote. We find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003635132
We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified envy, while the strategy-proof SD ensures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495059
We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified envy, while the strategy-proof SD ensures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014318363
.e., underconfident agents are more likely to accept early offers than overconfident agents. The experiment identifies a behavioral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574204
.e., underconfident agents are more likely to accept early offers than overconfident agents. The experiment identifies a behavioral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592125
-confident agents are more likely to accept early offers than overconfident agents. The experiment identifies a behavioral determinant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012143460
agents are more likely to accept early offers than overconfident agents. The experiment identifies a behavioral determinant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138436
The paper surveys the experimental literature on matching markets. It covers house allocation, school choice, and two-sided matching markets such as college admissions. The main focus of the survey is on truth-telling and strategic manipulations by the agents, on the stability and efficiency of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012004446
The paper surveys the experimental literature on matching markets. It covers house allocation, school choice, and two-sided matching markets such as college admissions. The main focus of the survey is on truth-telling and strategic manipulations by the agents, on the stability and efficiency of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012033568
.e., underconfident agents are more likely to accept early offers than overconfident agents. The experiment identifies a behavioral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591092