In their seminal work, The Calculus of Consent (1962), Buchanan and Tullock develop a decision model which embodies fundamental relation­ships relevant to institutional choices. However, the Buchanan-Tullock model remains "general," thus inviting others to specify details and to develop...

This paper formulates a simple mathematical framework for the selection of an optimum "relative unanimity” collective decision rule. The approach is first to identify the benefits of moving from a rule of simple majority towards a rule of full unanimity. Then, the costs of moving from simple...

Numerous earlier studies have, for the most part, found empirical support for the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis for the periods of the 1950s and 1960s. The present study draws on more recent data, including the 1980 Census of the Population, to find additional new support for the Tiebout-Tullock...

This paper extends our analysis of the identification of an "optimum relative unanimity." This is done principally through clarifying certain terms and correcting a misinterpretation of why the minimum possible value for an optimum relative unanimity is a simple majority, i.e., greater than 50%.

The original Buchanan-Tullock formulation of collective decision-making costs may be expanded to: <Equation ID="E1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"> $$C_i =C_i (N_a ,N,H)$$ </EquationSource> </Equation> <Equation ID="E2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"> $$D_i =D_i (N_a ,H)$$ </EquationSource> </Equation> <Equation ID="E3"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"> $$G_i =G_i (N,H)$$ </EquationSource> </Equation> Analysis of the effects of group size (N), decision rules (N <Subscript> a </Subscript>), and homogeneity (H) on external costs (C <Subscript> i </Subscript>),...</subscript></subscript></equationsource></equation></equationsource></equation></equationsource></equation>