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Credibility and duration of political contests and the extent of rent dissipation
Kahana, Nava; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000852198
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More on alternative objectives of labor-managed firms
Kahana, Nava - In: Journal of comparative economics : the journal of the … 13 (1989) 4, pp. 527-538
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001078502
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Uncertain preassigned non-contestable and contestable rents
Kahana, Nava; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - In: European economic review : EER 43 (1999) 9, pp. 1705-1721
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001417828
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Pre-assigned rents and bureaucratic friction
Kahana, Nava; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - In: Economics of governance 3 (2002) 3, pp. 241-248
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001722403
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A complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution
Kahana, Nava; Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - In: Economics letters 101 (2008) 2, pp. 142-144
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003791192
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The efficient and fair approval of "multiple-cost-single-benefit" projects under unilateral information
Kahana, Nava; Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - In: Journal of public economic theory 11 (2009) 6, pp. 947-960
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909830
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The efficient and fair approval of "multiple-cost - single-benefit" projects under unilateral information
Kahana, Nava; Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2009
This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003845920
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The efficient and fair approval of "multiple-cost - "single-benefit" projects under unilateral information
Kahana, Nava; Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2009
This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-costsingle-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003847080
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Production theory with profit‐constrained revenue‐maximization: The duality approach
Kahana, Nava; Nitzan, Shmuel - In: Managerial and Decision Economics 9 (1988) 4, pp. 269-273
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011005981
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The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple-Cost-Single-Benefit” Projects Under Unilateral Information
Kahana, Nava; Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel - Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University - 2009
This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008626030