At political boundaries, local leaders often have weak incentives to reduce polluting activity because the social costs are borne by downstream neighbors. This paper exploits a natural experiment set in China in which the central government changed the local political promotion criteria and...

China's environmental regulators have sought to reduce the Yangtze River's water pollution. We document that this regulatory effort has had two unintended consequences. First, the regulation's spatial differential stringency has displaced economic activity upstream. As polluting activity...

China's environmental regulators have sought to reduce the Yangtze River's water pollution. We document that this regulatory effort has had two unintended consequences. First, the regulation's spatial differential stringency has displaced economic activity upstream. As polluting activity...

At political boundaries, local leaders often have weak incentives to reduce polluting activity because the social costs are borne by downstream neighbors. This paper exploits a natural experiment set in China in which the central government changed the local political promotion criteria and...