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In Broad Daylight : Fuller Information and Higher-Order Punishment Opportunities Can Promote Cooperation
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis - 2013
The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims … undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. Varying treatments of a voluntary contributions experiment, we find that availability … of higher-order punishment opportunities increases cooperation and efficiency when subjects have full information on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014169011
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Play it again : partner choice, reputation building and learning in restarting, finitely-repeated dilemma games
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G. - 2013
can promote cooperation through a combination of sorting and opportunistic signaling, with late period defections by … remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126752
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Civic engagement as a second-order public good : the cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2019
taxation. In addition, we find that local social interaction among subgroups of participants also boosts cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012060889
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From locality to continent: A comment on the generalization of an experimental study
Kamei, Kenju - In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics … 41 (2012) 2, pp. 207-210
Kocher et al. (2008) find that conditional willingness to contribute to a public good is considerably stronger at a U.S. research site, Appalachian State University, than at sites in Europe and Asia. I find that the willingness at Brown University, in Rhode Island, is not significantly different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573926
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Play it again: Partner choice, reputation building and learning in restarting, finitely-repeated dilemma games
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis - 2013
can promote cooperation through a combination of sorting and opportunistic signaling, with late period defections by … remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420270
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Conditional Punishment
Kamei, Kenju - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishment decisions to an individual are on average significantly positively proportional to other members’ punishment decisions to that individual.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260305
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Conditional punishment
Kamei, Kenju - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 2, pp. 199-202
We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishment decisions to an individual are on average significantly positively proportional to other members’ punishment decisions to that individual.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933289
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Civic engagement as a second-order public good: The cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2019
taxation. In addition, we find that local social interaction among subgroups of participants also boosts cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012385442
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Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma
Kamei, Kenju - 2019
groups achieve a higher level of cooperation when they democratically select the partner matching protocol by voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012893145
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State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2011
The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836655