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The Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating the Safety-Net Consequences of Regulation-Induced Innovation
Kane, Edward J. - 2010
To be effective, programs of regulatory reform must address the incentive conflicts that intensify financial risk-taking and undermine government insolvency detection and crisis management. Subsidies to risk taking that large institutions extract from the financial safety net encourage managers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013140025
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The Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating the Safety-Net Consequences of Regulation-Induced Innovation
Kane, Edward J. - 2014
To be effective, programs of regulatory reform must address the incentive conflicts that intensify financial risk-taking and undermine government insolvency detection and crisis management. Subsidies to risk taking that large institutions extract from the financial safety net encourage managers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070578
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Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-and-Unwind Banks in the US and EU Before and During the Great Recession
Kane, Edward J.; Carbo-Valverde, Santiago; … - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2011
This paper models and estimates ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836380
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Tracking Variation in Systemic Risk at Us Banks During 1974-2013
Hovakimian, Armen - 2015
to individual banks in the Merton tradition (1974) as a combination put option for the deep tail of bank losses and a … knock-in stop-loss call on bank assets. This model expresses the value of taxpayer loss exposure from a string of defaults … the face value of the debt of the entire sector. We conceive of an individual bank's systemic risk as its contribution to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017765
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Tracking Variation in Systemic Risk at US Banks During 1974-2013
Hovakimian, Armen - 2015
to individual banks in the Merton tradition (1974) as a combination put option for the deep tail of bank losses and a … knock-in stop-loss call on bank assets. This model expresses the value of taxpayer loss exposure from a string of defaults … the face value of the debt of the entire sector. We conceive of an individual bank's systemic risk as its contribution to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036705
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Dynamic inconsistency of capital forbearance : long-run versus short-run effects of too-big-to-fail policymaking
Kane, Edward J. - In: Financial risks, stability, and globalization : papers …, (pp. 320-339). 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001718473
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Dynamic inconsistency of capital forbearance : long-run vs short-run effects of too-big-to-fail policymaking
Kane, Edward J. - In: Pacific-Basin finance journal 9 (2001) 4, pp. 281-299
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001611707
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Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-and-Unwind Banks in the US and EU Before and During the Great Recession
Carbo-Valverde, Santiago - 2011
This paper investigates the links between regulatory arbitrage, financial instability, and taxpayer loss exposures. We model and estimate ex ante safety-net benefits from increased leverage and asset volatility at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Hypothesis tests...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130936
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Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-And-Unwind Banks in the US and EU Before and During the Great Recession
Kane, Edward J. - 2011
In this paper we model and estimate ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122575
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Safety-Net Losses from Abandoning Glass-Steagall Restrictions
Carow, Kenneth A. - 2014
, but increases in bank bargaining power could increase funding costs and/or decrease capital market access. Customers may … increased bank bargaining power, especially vis-a-vis credit-constrained customers for whom safety-net subsidies are unlikely to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068332