We examine how private placements of equity (PPEs) affect debtholder wealth. We find that banks charge higher loan spreads, require more collateral, and impose stricter covenants for firms conducting PPEs. The results are more pronounced for firms without a value-enhancing PPE feature,...

This paper examines the disciplinary role of corporate pension deficits in the market for corporate control. We find that companies with larger pension deficits are less likely to engage in diversifying mergers, experience higher merger announcement returns, pay lower premiums to targets, and...

Using a large sample of Chinese firms, we examine performance differences between firms with female and male chairs and the channels through which such differences arise. After controlling for the presence of female CEOs and non-chair female directors, we find that chairwoman firms perform...

We find that firms appointing first-time independent directors experience an increase in firm value, especially among firms with well-functioning boards, firms with less powerful CEOs, and non-complex firms. Unlike seasoned independent directors, first-time directors are associated with higher...

Using block share acquisitions made by private equity (PE) funds, we examine the sources of value gains in PE minority equity investments. We find that the targets in PE acquisitions, particularly poorly performing targets, targets with high R&D intensity, and targets whose boards have...

We examine whether outside directors with government experience add value to their firms. We find that government directors are more likely to miss board meetings and that their appointment announcements are greeted more negatively. Firms with government directors also experience poorer...

We develop and test a model in which managerial overconfidence offsets the underinvestment problem arising from managerial myopia. Using a three-period investment model in which we capture managerial myopia by hyperbolic discounting, we show that both overconfident owner-managers and...