This paper examines the disciplinary role of corporate pension deficits in the market for corporate control. We find that companies with larger pension deficits are less likely to engage in diversifying mergers, experience higher merger announcement returns, pay lower premiums to targets, and...

Using a large sample of earnings announcements made by firms belonging to Korean chaebols, we examine propping (i.e., negative tunneling) within a chaebol. Consistent with the market's ex-ante valuation of intra-group propping, we find that the announcement of increased (decreased) earnings over...

Using a large sample of partial block acquisitions in the U.S., we examine the importance of geographic proximity in corporate governance and target returns. We find that block acquirers have a strong preference for geographically proximate targets and acquirers that purchase block shares in...

Using a comprehensive sample of equity-linked private securities offerings by Korean firms from 1989 to 2000, we examine whether such offerings can be used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms belonging to a chaebol. We find that the chaebol-affiliated issuers sell private securities at a...

We examine post-takeover restructuring activity and the sources of gains in large U.S. targets of foreign acquirers. We find that layoffs and selloffs are less important in justifying the target premium in foreign takeovers than in domestic takeovers. In contrast, U.S. targets in foreign...

Using a large sample of Chinese firms, we examine performance differences between firms with female and male chairs and the channels through which such differences arise. After controlling for the presence of female CEOs and non-chair female directors, we find that chairwoman firms perform...

Using a large sample of block acquisitions, this paper examines the governance role of customers that acquire block ownership in supplier shares. We find that compared to targets acquired by noncustomers, those acquired by customers experience higher abnormal announcement returns, larger...

We examine how friendly boards affect firm innovation. Using CEO-director social connections as a measure of board friendliness, we find that firms with friendly boards create more patents and citations. The positive relation between friendly boards and innovation are more pronounced when firms'...

We examine whether outside directors with government experience add value to their firms. We find that government directors are more likely to miss board meetings and that their appointment announcements are greeted more negatively. Firms with government directors also experience poorer...

We examine whether institutions' monitoring effectiveness is related to the number of their blockholdings. We find that the number of blocks that a firm's large institutions hold is positively associated with forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover-performance sensitivity, abnormal returns...