We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price...

Markets are increasingly used as information aggregation mechanisms to predict future events. If policy makers make use markets, parties may attempt to manipulate the market in order to influence decisions. We experimentally find that policymakers could still benefit from following information...

In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics...

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price...

In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics...

Markets are increasingly used as information aggregation mechanisms to predict future events. If policy makers make use markets, parties may attempt to manipulate the market in order to influence decisions. We experimentally find that policymakers could still benefit from following information...

In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics...