If principals are allowed to choose between a revenue sharing, a bonus and a trust contract, a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue sharing contract. We find that this choice is the most efficient while at the same time being fair in the Paretian sense that on average...

We use an experiment to show that conformity to a cue by an authority, due to social image utility towards the authority, is a powerful motivating mechanism. We do this in an experiment where obedience implies the destruction of half of the earnings of another subject at a cost to one's own...

We report the results of an economic experiment on how social preferences and behavioral imitation lead to the social clustering of investment decisions, even if the expected return of the underlying asset is known. During the experiment, subjects are asked how much of their endowment they wish...

If principals are allowed to choose between a revenue sharing, a bonus and a trust contract, a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue sharing contract. We find that this choice is the most efficient while at the same time being fair in the Paretian sense that on average...