Pecuniary externalities in models with financial friction justify macroprudential policies for preventing economic agents'excessive risk taking. We extend the Diamond and Rajan (2012) model of banks with the production factors and explore how a pe- cuniary externality affects a bank's leverage....

Previous studies have stressed that in ation dynamics exhibit a substantial disper- sion across sectors. Using US producer price data, we present evidence that sectoral in ation persistence is negatively correlated with market concentration, which is diffi- cult to reconcile with the prediction...

This paper discusses the lean vs. clean policy debate in managing financial crises based on dynamic general equilibrium models with an occasionally binding collateral constraint. We show that a full state-contingent subsidy for debtors can restore the first-best allocations by forestalling...

A fast growing literature on small open economy models with pecuniary externalities has provided the theoretical grounds for the policy analysis of macro prudential regulations. Using the framework of Jeanne and Korinek (2010), we investigate whether a subsidy on debt during crises as a form of...

This note provides an example of a case where …nancial instability can be ampli…ed by stable fundamentals rather than risky fundamentals, using a variation of Diamond and Rajan (2009). Paper type – Research paper

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model that explicitly includes a banking sector engaged in a maturity mismatch. We demonstrate that rational competitive banks take on excessive risks systemically, resulting in overleverage and ine¢ ciently high crisis probabilities. The model...

A fast-growing literature on small open economy models with pecuniary external- ities has provided the theoretical grounds for the policy analysis of macro-prudential regulations and bailouts. Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci, and Young (2012a) recently showed that the macro-prudential regulations...

We examine the role of bank leverage to explain why the 2007-08 financial crisis unfolded at a time when the economy appears to be less fragile to crisis risks. To this end, we extend the model introduced by Diamond and Rajan (2012) to a variant where the probability of financial crises varies...

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model that explicitly includes a banking sector with a maturity mismatch. We demonstrate that, despite the perfect competition in the banking sector, rational banks take on excessive risks systemically, resulting in overleverage and inefficiently...