In this paper we consider solutions which select from the core. For games with side payments with at least four players, it is well-known that no core-selection satifies monotonicity for all coalitions; for the particular class of core-selections found by maximizing a social welfare function...

A strong representation of a committee, formalized as a simple game, on a convex and closed set of alternatives is a game form with the members of the committee as players such that (i) the winning coalitions of the simple game are exactly those coalitions, which can get any given alternative...

In a recent work by Dolan and Edlin it is concluded that no link can be established between cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). However, the conclusion seems to depend rather heavily on what is understood by a link between CBA and CEA as well as on the exact...

The concept of capabilities, introduced originally by Sen with the aim to provide a better basis for the theory of inequality, has inspired many researchers but has not found any simple formal representation which might be instrumental in the construction of a comprehensive theory of equality....

An effectivity function assigns to each coalition of individuals in a society a family of subsets of alternatives such that the coalition can force the outcome of society’s choice to be a member of each of the subsets separately. A representation of an effectivity function is a game form with...

The concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium was introduced by Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston [1987]. In the present paper, we consider the representation problem for coalition proof Nash equilibrium: For a given effectivity function, describing the power structure or the system of rights of...

A well-known impossibility theorem in social choice theory states that every non-dictatorial social choice function, assigning a unique alternative from a set of at least three to every profile of individual preferences, can be manipulated. In this paper we examine a particular family of social...

A social choice correspondance is strongly implementable if there is a mechanism such that its strong Nash equilibrium outcomes coincide with the alternatives chosen by the social choice correspondance. It is known that a strongly implementable social choice correspondence is contained in the...

In recent years, there has been increased interest in setting up guidelines for carrying out cost-effectiveness analysis of medical interventions, and some such guidelines have indeed been established. In the paper, we present a model of information retrievement and use in which we can study the...

We consider a simple two-country model, where each country produces a consumption good from a single input. Production takes time, and the model is considered over two consecutive periods. There are three categories of economic agents, namely factor owners, entrepreneurs, and financial...