In an experiment on a subjective claims problem we compare three unanimity bargaining procedures - the Demand, the …

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and …, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … institutional design and agent selection in credence goods markets. …

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to … determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields …

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and …, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … institutional design and agent selection in credence goods markets. …

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to … determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields …

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and …, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … institutional design and agent selection in credence goods markets. -- Distributional preferences ; credence goods ; verifiability …

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to … determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields …

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to … determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields …

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to … determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields …

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and …, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … institutional design and agent selection in credence goods markets. -- distributional preferences ; credence goods ; verifiability …