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The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services
Kerschbamer, Rudolf - 2009
Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013153013
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The impact of distributional preferences on (experimental) markets for expert services
Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657628
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The economics of credence goods : on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657635
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The impact of distributional preferences on (experimental) markets for expert services
Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2009
Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003931304
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The economics of credence goods : an experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation, and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - In: The American economic review 101 (2011) 2, pp. 526-555
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248365
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The economics of credence goods : on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. -- credence goods ; experiment ; liability ; verifiability ; reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733215
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The impact of distributional preferences on (experimental) markets for expert services
Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2009 - This Version: 14. December 2009
Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009736635
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The economics of credence goods : on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003813049
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The economics of credence goods : on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. -- Credence goods ; experiment ; liability ; verifiability ; reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003814341
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The economics of credence goods : on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003880630