cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two stable sets of equilibria enabling cooperation, one for low CBRs …-order discriminators which highlights the necessity for higher-order information to sustain cooperation through indirect reciprocity. In a … laboratory experiment, we find that more than 75% of subjects play strategies that belong to the predicted equilibrium set …

cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two stable sets of equilibria enabling cooperation, one for low CBRs …-order discriminators which highlights the necessity for higher-order information to sustain cooperation through indirect reciprocity. In a … laboratory experiment, we find that more than 75% of subjects play strategies that belong to the predicted equilibrium set …

cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two stable sets of equilibria enabling cooperation, one for low CBRs …-order discriminators which highlights the necessity for higher-order information to sustain cooperation through indirect reciprocity. In a … laboratory experiment, we find that more than 75% of subjects play strategies that belong to the predicted equilibrium set …

subjects' behavior in the public good situation represents conditional cooperation, characterized by both future-oriented and …

players to choose team remuneration in a series of laboratory experiments. This allows for high cooperation payoffs but also … provides individual free-riding incentives. Due to significant cooperation, we observe that, in team remuneration, participants …