We study 120 rights offerings by closed-end funds from 1988–1998. On average, rights offerings are announced when funds trade at a premium. This premium turns into a discount over the course of the offering. The premium decline is more severe when increases in the investment advisor's...

We study 120 rights offerings by closed-end funds over 1988-1998. On average, rights offerings are announced when funds trade at a premium. This premium turns into a discount over the course of the offering. The premium decline is more severe when the increases in investment advisor's...

We study 67 rights offerings by closed-end funds over 1988-1994 and gauge their impact on the fund's shareholders and managers. We find that funds conduct rights offerings while they are trading at a premium, reverts to a discount after the offering. Theories of asymmetric information about...

To examine the role of executive compensation in corporate acquisition decisions, we compare the compensation of top executives in two groups of firms: firms undertaking large acquisitions and a control sample of non-acquirors. Before the acquisition, we find a positive relation between firm...

Jensen (1986), among others, suggests that executives may increase firm size beyond the optimum because executive compensation relates positively to firm size. We test this hypothesis by (i) analyzing changes in executive compensation around large acquisitions, and (ii) by comparing executive...

We study 120 rights offerings by closed-end funds over 1988-1998. On average, rights offerings are announced when funds trade at a premium. This premium turns into a discount over the course of the offering. The premium decline is more severe when the increases in investment advisor's...