We develop a network-flow approach for characterizing interim-allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations. Our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi-unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints, both ceilings and floors....

Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005) analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the revenue ranking between standard auctions. In this comment,...

We study alternative methods of assigning scarce resources to individuals who may be liquidity-constrained. Selling the resources via auctions is increasingly popular, but that method may produce an inefficient allocation when agents are liquidity constrained. A simple non-market scheme such as...

This article studies different methods of assigning a good to budget-constrained agents. Schemes that assign the good randomly and allow resale may outperform the competitive market in terms of Utilitarian efficiency. The socially optimal mechanism involves random assignment at a discount--an...

We develop a network-flow approach for characterizing interim-allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations. Our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi-unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints, both ceilings and floors....

Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005, henceforth DKS) analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the revenue ranking between standard auctions. In...

We examine the use of breakup fees as a device for target firms to recruit white knights in response to a hostile takeover bid. When bidders have interdependent valuations of the target, the possible use of a breakup fee to subsidize entry of a subsequent bidder overdisciplines the initial...

We study an optimal weak collusion-proof auction in an environment where a subset (or subsets) of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited...

This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding behavior in first- and second-price auctions. The comparative static hypotheses associated with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well as the general predictions...