Showing 1 - 10 of 83
The agency model used by Apple and other platform providers such as Google allows upstream firms (content providers like book publishers and developers of apps) to choose the retail prices of their products (RPM) subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. We show that (i) this leads to higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010690385
This paper examines the use of market-share thresholds (safe harbors) in evaluating whether a given vertical practice should be challenged. Such thresholds are typically found in vertical restraints guidelines (e.g., the 2000 Guidelines for the European Commission and the 1985 Guidelines for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264159
The agency model used by Apple and other platform providers such as Google allows upstream firms (content providers like book publishers and developers of apps) to choose the retail prices of their products (RPM) subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. We show that (i) this leads to higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319390
The agency model is a business format used by online digital platform providers (such as Apple and Google) in which retail pricing decisions are delegated to upstream content providers subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. In a non-cooperative setting with competition both upstream and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011807810
The agency model used by Apple and other platform providers such as Google allows upstream firms (content providers like book publishers and developers of apps) to choose the retail prices of their products (RPM) subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. We show that (i) this leads to higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009786199
The aim of this chapter is to survey the media economics literature on mergers. In particular, we try to accentuate where the effects of mergers differ between conventional one-sided markets and two-sided media markets (though not all media mergers are within two-sided markets). We focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025247
We consider a model in which firms use resale price maintenance (RPM) to dampen competition. We find that even though the motive for using RPM is thus anticompetitive, market forces may limit the overall adverse impact on consumers. Indeed, we find that when there are a large number of firms in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138915
The agency model used by Apple and other platform providers such as Google allows upstream firms (content providers like book publishers and developers of apps) to choose the retail prices of their products (RPM) subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. We show that (i) this leads to higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315732
This paper examines the use of market-share thresholds (safe harbors) in evaluating whether a given vertical practice should be challenged. Such thresholds are typically found in vertical restraints guidelines (e.g., the 2000 Guidelines for the European Commission and the 1985 Guidelines for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316999
Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook result in one-sided markets is that a government may increase a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419340