all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterize the core by anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and … by characterizing the core on the domain of no odd rings roommate markets by individual rationality, anonymity, Pareto …

) blocking dynamics in two-sided one-to-one matching markets with continuous side payments (assignment problems, Shapley and … obtained from the previous one by satisfying a blocking pair (i.e., by matching the two blocking agents and assigning new … the model (i.e., for marriage markets, one-to-one matching, or discretized assignment problems), the existence of blocking …

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly … dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this … von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate …

matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only … if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts … have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core). An important …

) blocking dynamics in two-sided one-to-one matching markets with continuous side payments (assignment problems, Shapley and … obtained from the previous one by satisfying a blocking pair (i.e., by matching the two blocking agents and assigning new … the model (i.e., for marriage markets, one-to-one matching, or discretized assignment problems), the existence of blocking …