Showing 1 - 10 of 31
this process as a (non-empty) solution concept. We show that each core allocation always constitutes a singleton recurrent … that some core allocations are less likely to be final allocations of the dynamic process than cycles composed of non-core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008609830
the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677738
all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterize the core by anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and … by characterizing the core on the domain of no odd rings roommate markets by individual rationality, anonymity, Pareto …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010692192
We study a labor market with finitely many heterogeneous workers and firms to illustrate the decentralized (myopic) blocking dynamics in two-sided one-to-one matching markets with continuous side payments (assignment problems, Shapley and Shubik, 1971). A labor market is unstable if there is at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010696483
, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic coalition formation games, the Core is characterized by coalitional … unanimity and Maskin monotonicity (see also Takamiya, 2010, Theorem 1). Next, we characterize the Core for solvable hedonic … games, there exists a solution not equal to the Core that satisfies coalitional unanimity, consistency, competition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106583
Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547165
We extend Jackson and Watts's (2002) result on the coincidence of S-stochastically stable and core stable networks from … marriage problems to roommate problems. In particular, we show that the existence of a side-optimal core stable network, on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547235
matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only … if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts … have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core). An important …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547341
characterizations of the core using either competition or resource sensitivity. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005754944
characterizations of the core using either competition or resource sensitivity. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008475798