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Auctions : theory and practice
Klemperer, Paul - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004908426
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Using and Abusing Economic Theory
Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
politically important. I illustrate with some disastrous government auctions, but also show the value of economic theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498003
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Toeholds and Takeovers
Bulow, Jeremy; Huang, Ming; Klemperer, Paul - EconWPA - 1996
Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a ``toehold'' bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413099
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Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Klemperer, Paul - EconWPA - 1999
a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), 1999.) We begin with the … most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and … number of bidders, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, payments for quality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413297
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The Generalized War of Attrition
Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996
We generalize the War of Attrition model to allow for N + K firms competing for N prizes. Two special cases are of particular interest. First, if firms continue to pay their full costs after dropping out (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463982
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Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976795
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Auctions: Theory and Practice
Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2004
picking selectively – an advanced undergraduate or MBA course on auctions and auction design. Part A introduces the basic … superficially unconnected with auctions. Part C discusses practical auction design. Part D describes the one-hundred-billion dollar … 3G mobile-phone license auctions. None of the writing is technical, except in the Appendices. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133069
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Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2009
We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding.  The sequential process is always more efficient.  But...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004186
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Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
Cramton, Peter; Gibbons, Robert; Klemperer, Paul - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1987
Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim- individually-...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988765
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Toeholds and Takeovers
Bulow, Jeremy; Huang, Ming; Klemperer, Paul - EconWPA - 1999
(forthcoming Journal of Political Economy). Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a "toehold" bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076990