Showing 1 - 10 of 10
We apply the procedure to both existing and new classes of cooperative situations: sequencing situations without initial ordering, maintenance problems, minimum cost spanning tree situations, travelling salesman problems, shared taxi problems and travelling repairman problems.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090736
Abstract: This article characterizes the per capita nucleolus for bankruptcy games as a bankruptcy rule. This rule, called the cligths rule, is based on the wellknown constrained equal awards principle. The essential feature of the rule however is that, for each bankruptcy problem, it takes into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091730
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If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091845
This paper analyzes congestion effects on network situations from a cooperative game theoretic perspective. In network situations players have to connect themselves to a source. Since we consider publicly available networks any group of players is allowed to use the entire network to establish...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092536
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Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underly- ing thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090602
This paper analyses the role of transfer payments and strategic con- tracting within two-person strategic form games with monetary pay- offs. First, it introduces the notion of transfer equilibrium as a strat- egy combination for which individual stability can be supported by allowing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090963
Abstract: Proper equilbrium plays an importent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091574
Abstract: In this paper we provide a characterisation of the set of fall back equilibria for 2 x n bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092036