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Epstein (2009) describes three Ellsberg-style thought experiments and argues that they pose difficulties for the smooth ambiguity model of decision making under uncertainty developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005).  We revisit these thought exeperiments and find, to the contrary,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984412
We propose and axiomatize a new model of preferences that achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective information, and ambiguity attitude, a characteristic of the decision maker's tastes.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135384
We propose and axiomatize a model of preferences over acts such that the decision maker evaluates acts according to the expectation (over a set of probability measures) of an increasing transformation of an act`s expected utility. This expectation is calculated using a subjective probability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090642
This paper axiomatizes an intertemporal version of the Smooth Ambiguity decision model developed in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). A key feature of the model is that it achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective beliefs,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181140
We examine a variety of preference-based definitions of ambiguous events in the context of the smooth ambiguity model.  We first consider the definition proposed in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) based on the classic Ellsberg two-urn paradox (Ellsberg (1961)), and show that it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800184
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We offer a theory of polarization as an optimal response to ambiguity. Suppose individual A's beliefs first-order stochastically dominate individual B's. They observe a common signal. They exhibit polarization if A's posterior dominates her prior and B's prior dominates her posterior. Given...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352846