We find that Epstein (2010)'s Ellsberg-style thought experiments pose, contrary to his claims, no paradox or difficulty for the smooth ambiguity model of decision making under uncertainty developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005). Not only are the thought experiments naturally handled...

We axiomatize preferences that can be represented by a monotonic aggregation of subjective expected utilities generated by a utility function and some set of i.i.d. probability measures over a product state space, S-super-∞. For such preferences, we define relevant measures, show that they are...

We examine a variety of preference-based definitions of ambiguous events in the context of the smooth ambiguity model.  We first consider the definition proposed in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) based on the classic Ellsberg two-urn paradox (Ellsberg (1961)), and show that it...

We define a behavioral concept of relevance in the context of decision making under uncertainty.  We argue that this concept provides a sensible answer to the question "What probabilistic environments do an individuals' preferences reveal as mattering to her decisions?" under a symmetry...

We axiomatize preferences that can be represented by a monotonic aggregation of subjective expected utilities generated by a utility function and some set of i.i.d. probability measures over a product state space, S1. For such preferences, we define relevant measures, show that they are treated...

The α-MEU model and the smooth ambiguity model are two popular models in decision making under ambiguity. However, the axiomatic foundations of these two models are not completely understood. We provide axiomatic foundations of these models in a symmetric setting with a product state space...

This paper axiomatizes an intertemporal version of the Smooth Ambiguity decision model developed in [P. Klibanoff, M. Marinacci, S. Mukerji, A smooth model of decision making under ambiguity, Econometrica 73 (6) (2005) 1849-1892]. A key feature of the model is that it achieves a separation...

We propose and axiomatize a new model of preferences that achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective information, and ambiguity attitude, a characteristic of the decision maker's tastes.