unobservable and incomplete contracts with and without renegotiation opportunities under the assumption that the principal cannot … outcomes to a subset of Nash equilibrium outcomes and renegotiation imposes further constraints. Yet, there is a large class of …

analyze the equilibrium outcomes of twostage games with renegotiation-proof third-party contracts in relation to the … outcomes of the game without contracts. Introducing renegotiation, in general, imposes further constraints and in some games …

and can sign renegotiable contracts with a neutral third-party. Our aim is to understand whether renegotiation-proof third … obtains a payoff at least as large as his "individually rational payoff" can be supported. Renegotiation-proofness imposes …

used as commitment devices when it is impossible to commit not to renegotiate them. We characterize renegotiation …. If contracts are observable, then the second mover obtains her best possible payoff given that she plays a renegotiation … externalities and to a model of credibility of monetary policy and show that in both cases renegotiation-proofness imposes a very …

used as commitment devices when it is impossible to commit not to renegotiate them. We characterize renegotiation …. If contracts are observable, then the second mover obtains her best possible payoff given that she plays a renegotiation … externalities and to a model of credibility of monetary policy and show that in both cases renegotiation-proofness imposes a very …

unobservable and incomplete contracts with and without renegotiation opportunities under the assumption that the principal cannot … outcomes to a subset of Nash equilibrium outcomes and renegotiation imposes further constraints. Yet, there is a large class of …

used as commitment devices when it is impossible to commit not to renegotiate them. We characterize renegotiation …. If contracts are observable, then the second mover obtains her best possible payoff given that she plays a renegotiation … externalities and to a model of credibility of monetary policy and show that in both cases renegotiation-proofness imposes a very …

incomplete contractswith andwithout renegotiation opportunities under the assumption that the principal cannot observe every … subset of Nash equilibrium outcomes and renegotiation imposes further constraints. Yet, there is a large class of games in …