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Holmstrom's (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way - which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision makers'...
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In many economic situations several principals contract with the same agents sequentially. Asymmetric learning about agents' abilities provides the first principal with an informational advantage and has profound implications for the design of incentive contracts. We show that the principal...
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Young professionals typically do not enter into life-long employment relations with a single firm. Therefore, future employers can learn about individuals' abilities from the observable facts regarding earlier work relations. We show that these informational spill-overs have profound...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003275078
The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often place employees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second, demotions are extremely rare. Why do organizations not correct 'wrong' promotion decision? This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003635211
The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often place employees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second, demotions are extremely rare. Why do organizations not correct 'wrong' promotion decision? This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012773414
Inefficient job assignments are usually explained with incomplete information about employees' abilities or contractual imperfections. We show that inefficient assignments arise even with full information about employees' types and complete contracts. Our further results provide a new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123052
Young professionals typically do not enter into life-long employment relations with a single firm. Therefore, future employers can learn about individuals' abilities from the observable facts regarding earlier work relations. We show that these informational spill-overs have profound...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318139