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The Impact of Naïve Advice and Observational Learning in Beauty-contest Games
Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255507
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The Impact of Naïve Advice and Observational Learning in Beauty-contest Games
Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - 2007
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325406
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The impact of naive advice and observational learning in beauty-contest games
Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Fakultät für … - 2007
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naive advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005399043
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The Impact of Naïve Advice and Observational Learning in Beauty-contest Games
Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - Tinbergen Institute - 2007
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144513
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Does Stake Size matter for Cooperation and Punishment?
Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257415
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Choosing the carrot or the stick? Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations
Sutter, Matthias; Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin G. - 2008
We analyze an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293404
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Conditional cooperation on three continents
Kocher, Martin G.; Cherry, Todd; Kroll, Stephan; … - 2007
We show in a public goods experiment on three continents that conditional cooperation is a universal behavioral regularity. Yet, the number of conditional cooperators and the extent of conditional cooperation are much higher in the U.S.A. than anywhere else.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293430
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Does Stake Size matter for Cooperation and Punishment?
Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine - 2006
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325183
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Conditional cooperation on three continents
Kocher, Martin G.; Cherry, Todd L.; Kroll, Stephan; … - Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Fakultät für … - 2007
We show in a public goods experiment on three continents that conditional cooperation is a universal behavioral regularity. Yet, the number of conditional cooperators and the extent of conditional cooperation are much higher in the U.S.A. than anywhere else.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005399038
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The Team Allocator Game : Allocation Power in Public Goods Games
Karakostas, Alexandros; Kocher, Martin G.; Matzat, Dominik - 2021
We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games in which a distinguished team member, the team … allocator games are intended to capture natural asymmetries in hierarchical teams facing social dilemmas, such as those that … linear and best-shot public-good games, while it has no effect in the weakest-link public good. The team allocator uses her …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231747