Based on detailed regulatory intervention data among German banks during 1994-2008, we test if supervisory measures … and its duration while weak measures are insignificant. With the benefit of hindsight, we exclude banks that eventually …

In this paper, we investigate the claim that German banks are special compared to banks in other industrialised … economies. We show that banks are of particular importance to the German economy?as financial intermediary, as lender to the … corporate sector, and as part of the corporate governance system. Further, German banks are supervised by two supervisory …

In this paper, we investigate the claim that German banks are special compared to banks in other industrialised … economies. We show that banks are of particular importance to the German economy—as financial intermediary, as lender to the … corporate sector, and as part of the corporate governance system. Further, German banks are supervised by two supervisory …

compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Other than that, banks‘ responses to raise … fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast majority of non-CEO executives and those at well performing banks. We fail to … find evidence that banks with executives that are more affected by the bonus cap became less risky. In fact, numerous …

compensation did not induce an executive director exodus from EU banking because banks raised fixed compensation sufficiently to … and insurance effects associated with fixed compensation components. We also find that banks with directors that are more …

to abandon the industry. Banks indemnified executives sufficiently for the shock to retain them by raising fixed and … lowering variable compensation while complying with the cap. At the same time, banks' risk-adjusted performance deteriorated … average co-movement of banks with the market declined under the cap. …