We show that around one third of executive directors on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking have an employment history in the financial industry. The appointment of executives without a finance background associates with negative valuation effects....

Based on detailed regulatory intervention data among German banks during 1994-2008, we test if supervisory measures affect the likelihood and the timing of bank recovery. Severe regulatory measures increase both the likelihood of recovery and its duration while weak measures are insignificant....

To test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a simultaneous structural two-equations model that specifies the probability of a bailout and banks’ risk taking.We identify the effect of expected bailout probabilities on risk taking using exclusion restrictions...

We identify the connections between financial institutions from different sectors of the financial industry based on joint extreme movements in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. First, we estimate pairwise co-crash probabilities (CCP) to identify significant connections among 193 international...

Based on detailed regulatory intervention data among German banks during 1994-2008, we test if supervisory measures affect the likelihood and the timing of bank recovery. Severe regulatory measures increase both the likelihood of recovery and its duration while weak measures are insignificant....

We show that the presence of executive directors with prior experience in the finance industry is pervasive on the boards of European national banking supervisors. Up to one executive out of three has previously held positions in the industry she supervises (or in closely connected ones)....

We show that the presence of executive directors with prior experience in the finance industry is pervasive on the boards of European national banking supervisors. Up to one executive out of three has previously held positions in the industry he/she supervises. Appointments of such executives...

Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalisation. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm...

We test if interconnectedness in the interbank market is a channel through which banks affect each others riskiness. The evidence is based on quarterly bilateral exposures of all banks active in the Dutch interbank market between 1998 and 2008. A spatial lag model, borrowed from regional...

In this paper we analyse bank efficiency in Germany for four cross-sections of data during the period 1995-2001. Under the assumption of cost minimisation we obtain firm-specific efficiency estimates using stochastic frontier analysis. To explicitly allow for different risk preferences when...