Showing 1 - 10 of 59
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671965
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011158609
stability. Nevertheless, an embedding into a one-to-one agent--slot matching market shows that stable outcomes exist and can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019857
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599581
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011500742
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012110610
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012064946
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009744145
School choice plans in many cities grant students higher priority for some (but not all) seats at their neighborhood schools. This paper demonstrates how the precedence order, i.e. the order in which different types of seats are filled by applicants, has quantitative effects on distributional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459681
School choice plans in many cities grant students higher priority for some (but not all) seats at their neighborhood schools. This paper demonstrates how the precedence order, i.e. the order in which different types of seats are filled by applicants, has quantitative effects on distributional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083082