We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

stability. Nevertheless, an embedding into a one-to-one agent--slot matching market shows that stable outcomes exist and can be …

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in this …

In a general model of trading networks with bilateral contracts, we propose a suitably adapted chain stability concept … that plays the same role as pairwise stability in two-sided settings. We show that chain stability is equivalent to … stability if all agents' preferences are jointly fully substitutable and satisfy the Laws of Aggregate Supply and Demand. In the …

In a general model of trading networks with bilateral contracts, we propose a suitably adapted chain stability concept … that plays the same role as pairwise stability in two-sided settings. We show that chain stability is equivalent to … stability if all agents' preferences are jointly fully substitutable and satisfy the Laws of Aggregate Supply and Demand. In the …