If an altruist is expected to aid a person with low utility, that person may be induced to save little. Such behavior generates a good Samaritan dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. Governmental transfers, which restrict reallocation from a person who saves much to...

An altruistic agent who may aid a person with a low income may cause that person to exert little effort to increase his income. Such behavior generates a Dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. We show how governmental transfers, which do not allow for reallocation...

An altruistic agent who may aid a person with a low income may induce that person to exert little effort to increase his income. Such behavior generates a Good Samaritan Dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. Governmental transfers, which restrict reallocation from a...

We consider cities which can increase the income of landowners or of capital owners by improving the quality of public services. The improvement can come from innovation or from imitation. We find that when cities aim to benefit landowners, too many cities innovate; but too few cities innovate...

Residents both enjoy the policies adopted in their cities, and choose those policies. If some people can better evaluate policies than can others, then the most perceptive people will be the most willing to move to the city with better policies, thereby making that city more likely to adopt good...

Residents both enjoy the policies adopted in their cities, and choose those policies. If some people can better evaluate policies than can others, then the most perceptive people will be the most willing to move to the city with better policies, thereby making that city more likely to adopt good...