We examine a firm that can license its production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs. We show that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the...

We examine a firm that can license its production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs. We show that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the...

We consider how the amount of the technology transferred and the characteristics of the partneraffect licensing. We find that a partial technology transfer can be the joint-profit minimizingtransfer, though under weakly concave demand, a complete transfer always increases joint profitif there...

Joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct compensation, leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals such an advantage. We find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the market more competitive so as to...

Markets are often characterized with firms of differing capabilities with more efficient firms licensing their technology to lesser firms.  We  examine the effects that the amount of the technology transferred, and the characteristics of the partner have on this licensing.  We find that a...

Joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct compensation, leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals such an advantage.  We find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the market more competitive so as to...