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Bargaining with incomplete information : evolutionary stability in finite populations
Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - In: Journal of mathematical economics 65 (2016), pp. 118-131
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665695
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Evolutionary determinants of war
Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - In: Defence and peace economics 27 (2016) 4, pp. 520-534
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621184
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Evolutionary determinants of war
Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2013
This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198498
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Altruism and envy in contests : an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
Konrad, Kai A. - 2002
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514081
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Balance of power and the propensity of conflict
Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2015
experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is … higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players' unequal fighting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576771
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Balance of power and the propensity of conflict
Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - In: Games and economic behavior 103 (2017), pp. 168-184
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011792300
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Does a clean development mechanism facilitate international environmental agreements?
Konrad, Kai A.; Thum, Marcel - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 69 (2018) 4, pp. 837-851
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011939473
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Hanging together or being hung separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information ; conference paper
Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2013
bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may harm also the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338972
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Bargaining with Incomplete Information : Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations
Konrad, Kai A. - 2014
This paper considers evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in a take-it-or-leave-it offer bargaining game with …. Proposers, in turn, make more attractive offers than in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Efficiency-enhancing trade may break … down even when the responder has no private information. Overall, the probability of trade and ex post efficiency is lower …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048099
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Hanging together or hanged separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information
Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2014
additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012053740