In the context of international tax coordination incomplete information is one of the well-known frictions that can lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about tax coordination under complete and incomplete...

In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries.

We consider the hold-up problem between a foreign direct investor and the government(s) in a host country with weak governmental structure and lack of power to commit. Using Nash threats, we show that an efficient investment level can be sustained for a sufficiently high discount factor and ask...

This paper studies corporate tax competition if it is costly to learn some of the elements that determine the effective tax burden. Search cost may, but need not, eliminate the tax competition pressure. The outcome depends on the boundaries of tax rate and tax base choices. Search cost can...

This paper studies corporate tax competition if it is costly to learn some of the elements that determine the effective tax burden. Search cost may, but need not, eliminate the tax competition pressure. The outcome depends on the boundaries of tax rate and tax base choices. Search cost can...

This paper studies corporate tax competition if it is costly to learn some of the elements that determine the e¤ective tax burden. Search cost may, but need not, eliminate the tax competition pressure. The outcome depends on the boundaries of tax rate and tax base choices. Search cost can...