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Balance of power and the propensity of conflict
Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2015
experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is … higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players' unequal fighting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011637947
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Balance of power and the propensity of conflict
Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2015
experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is … higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players' unequal fighting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576771
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Balance of power and the propensity of conflict
Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und öffentliche … - 2014
experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is … higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players unequal fighting strengths …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011202941
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Moral cost, commitment, and committee size
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A. - 2003
Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But there are also some small moral costs for those who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306978
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Moral cost, commitment, and committee size
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A. - Abteilung "Marktprozesse und Steuerung", … - 2003
Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But there are also some small moral costs for those who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367935
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Moral Cost, Commitment, and Committee Size
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A. - 2011
Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not confiscate the profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But there are also some small moral costs for those who vote...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073310
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Moral Cost, Commitment, and Committee Size
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A. - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 161 (2005) 4, pp. 575-575
Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from an investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But in some situations there are also some small moral costs for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005581976
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Balance of power and the propensity of conflict
Morath, Florian; Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A. - 2015
experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is … higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players' unequal fighting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301433
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Balance of Power and the Propensity of Conflict
Herbst, Luisa - 2015
experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is … higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players unequal fighting strengths …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033103
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Bargaining with Incomplete Information : Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations
Konrad, Kai A. - 2014
This paper considers evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in a take-it-or-leave-it offer bargaining game with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048099