Showing 1 - 10 of 79
We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835218
by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation … why. Compared to a single stage conflict, such structures can reduce the overall resources that are dissipated among the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835345
We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011202941
Why is there delay in contests? In this paper we follow and extend the line of reasoning of Carl von Clausewitz to explain delay. For a given contest technology, delay may occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack, if the expected change in relative strengths is moderate, and if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367853
, R&D contests, electoral competition in political markets, military conflict and sports. I survey here this type of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367917
This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009397103
outside enemy, brothers in arms may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however …, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009397117
We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860231
We experimentally study endogenous alliance formation and contest effort choices in a generic three-player contest. Differences in intrinsic or extrinsic incentives to expend effort cause self-selection. Weakly motivated players have an incentive to enter into an alliance and to free-ride on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190199
conflict and more intense fighting. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140958