This paper analyzes socially optimal forest taxation when the government has a binding tax revenue requirement. In the Faustmann model the optimal design of forest taxation consists of non-distortionary taxes, such as site productivity tax, site value tax or profit tax. A combination of...

We study the socially optimal design of forest royalty and enforcement instruments in the case where concessions are allocated by a government, illegal logging incentives are present, and the government has available both area-based and value-based royalty instruments. When harvesters are risk...

We study the socially optimal design of forest royalty and enforcement instruments in the case where concessions are allocated by a government, illegal logging incentives are present, and the government has available both area-based and value-based royalty instruments. When harvesters are risk...

This paper analyzes the socially optimal forest taxation in the rotation framework when the government has a binding tax revenue requirement. In the Faustmann model the optimal design of taxation consists of non-distortionary taxes, such as site productivity tax, site value tax or profit tax. A...

We analyze the impact of entrepreneurship as an outside option on compensation contracts between a principal and an agent with bargaining power. In the first stage the parties bargain over the base wage and the profit share. In the second stage the principal determines the capital investment and...