We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with...

We study employment, employee effort, wages and profit sharing when firms face stochastic revenue shocks and when base wages and profit shares are determined through negotiations. The negotiated profit share depends positively on the relative bargaining power of the trade union and it has...

We address the question of how lending market competition, measured by the bargaining power of banks, affects the agency costs of debt finance. It is shown that intensified lending market competition will lead to lower lending rates and investment return distributions which are shifted towards...

We study the relationship between market structure and risk-taking in lending markets. Introduction of loan market competition will reduce lending rates and increase credit market fragility regardless of whether borrowers have access to investment projects displaying first-order or second-order...

We address how lending market competition, measured by banks' bargaining power, affects the agency costs of debt finance. We show that the threshold for obtaining loan finance is independent of the relative bargaining power of the financier. Moreover, intensified lending market competition leads...

We model the interaction between the concentration of the banking sector and the investment strategies of imperfectly competitive firms in the product market to address the question of whether competition makes loan markets more fragile. It is shown how a merger between two banks would typically...

We address the question of whether competition makes loan markets more fragile in the sense of increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of firms. This is done using a model of the interaction between the concentration of the banking sector and the investment strategies of imperfectly...

This paper studies the effect of credit market imperfections, measured by the relative bargaining power of banks, on the agency costs of debt finance. The threshold of obtaining loan finance is shown to be independent of the relative bargaining power of the financier. However, lower relative...

We address how lending market competition, measured by banks’ bargaining power, affects the agency costs of debt finance. We show that the threshold for obtaining loan finance is independent of the relative bargaining power of the financier. Moreover, intensified lending market competition...

We model the interaction between the concentration of the banking sector and the investment strategies of imperfectly competitive firms in the product market to address the question of whether competition makes loan markets more fragile. It is shown how a merger between two duopoly banks would...