We study the socially optimal design of forest royalty and enforcement instruments in the case where concessions are allocated by a government, illegal logging incentives are present, and the government has available both area-based and value-based royalty instruments. When harvesters are risk...

We study the socially optimal design of forest royalty and enforcement instruments in the case where concessions are allocated by a government, illegal logging incentives are present, and the government has available both area-based and value-based royalty instruments. When harvesters are risk...

We study the implications of product market competition and investment for price setting, wage bargaining and thereby for equilibrium unemployment in an economy with product and labour market imperfections. We show that intensified product market competition will reduce equilibrium unemployment,...

We study the implications of product and labor market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment under both exogenous and endogenous capital intensity. With endogenous capital intensity, stronger labor market imperfections always increase equilibrium unemployment. The relationship between the...

We investigate the implications of product market imperfections on profit sharing, wage negotiation and equilibrium unemployment. The optimal profit share, which the firms use as a wage-moderating commitment device, is below the bargaining power of the trade union. Intensified product market...

A three-stage game including investments, environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment (ecolabeling), in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. The firms’ incentives to invest in green technologies depend on...

The study looks at the implications of product market competition and investment for price setting, wage bargaining and thereby for equilibrium unemployment in an economy with product and labour market imperfections.We show that intensified product market competition will reduce equilibrium...

We address the question of how lending market competition, measured by the bargaining power of banks, affects the agency costs of debt finance. It is shown that intensified lending market competition will lead to lower lending rates and investment return distributions which are shifted towards...